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This paper examines differences in the stability of the foreign exchange, money, and 
stock markets, associated with the use of alternative monetary policy targets, based on 
data  from  a  panel  of  20  OECD  countries,  for  the  period  1961-2000.    The  main 
conclusion of the paper is that the choice of monetary policy target will significantly 
affect stability in financial markets. The use of inflation targets reduces the likelihood of 
crises in the foreign exchange and money markets (relative to any other monetary policy 
framework), suggesting that a central bank concerned with financial stability should 
adopt this framework.  Results also suggest that exchange rate targeting frameworks 
tend  to  have  higher  likelihood  of  foreign  exchange  and  money  market  crises,  but 
multilateral exchange rate arrangements have lower likelihood of crises than unilateral 
pegs.  The paper also includes a complete description of the monetary policy targets 
used in the countries analysed. 
Keywords:  monetary policy, rules, financial crises. 
RESUMO 
O  presente  artigo  analisa  diferenças  na  estabilidade  dos  mercados  financeiros, 
nomeadamente os mercados cambial, monetário, e de acções, associadas à utilização de 
metas de política monetária alternativas, para uma amosta de 20 países da OCDE, no 
período 1961-2000.  A principal conclusão do trabalho é que a escolha da estratégia de 
política  monetária  tem  uma  influência  significativa  na  estabilidade  dos  mercados 
financeiros.  A utilização de inflation targets reduz a probabilidade de ocorrência de 
crises nos mercados cambial e monetário (relativamente a qualquer outra estratégia), o 
que sugere que um banco central preocupado com a estabilidade do sistema financeiro 
deverá  adoptar  esta  estratégia.    Por  outro  lado,  os  resultados  também  sugerem  que 
estratégias baseadas em metas para a taxa de câmbio estão associadas a uma maior 
probabilidade de crises nos mercados cambial e monetário, apesar de acordos cambiais 
multilaterais terem uma menor probabilidade de crise que as estratégias assentes em 
paridades definidas unilateralmente.  Finalmente, o artigo inclui também uma descrição 
detalhada das metas de política monetária utilizadas nos países e período da amostra. 
Palavras-chave: política monetária, regras, crises financeiras.      
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This  paper  examines  the  likelihood  of  financial  crises  under  different  monetary 
frameworks in 20 OECD countries in the period 1961-2000.  Economists and central 
bankers  have  long  debated  the  merits  of  alternative  frameworks  for  the  conduct  of 
monetary policy.  One of the main questions in this debate has been whether the central 
banks  should  announce  quantitative  targets,  and  commit  to  achieving  them,  or 
alternatively, whether they should retain the discretion to decide monetary policy on a 
case-by-case basis. An associated question is which target to choose, if the choice is for 
the former.  These questions have been the starting point of a large body of research in 
recent years. 
In the evaluation of monetary policy frameworks, the most popular approach is to build 
structural models of the economy and then simulate the models stochastically under 
different monetary policy frameworks.  A framework would be considered better than 
another if the performance of the model economy is better under that framework, in 
terms  of  yielding  desirable  values  of  postulated  objective  functions,  with  these 
pertaining  primarily  to root-mean-square deviations from desired values of variables 
such as inflation or real GDP relative to trend.
1  Despite the usefulness of the model-
based approach, it cannot be the sole grounds for making policy decisions.  As Taylor 
(1999) argues, an historical analysis of monetary policy is a useful complement to the 
model-based approach, since it may give a better sense of how a policy framework 
might work in practice. 
The existing empirical literature only provides results that are model or country specific.  
One form of overcoming this problem is to analyse historical data from a panel that 
includes a sufficiently large number of countries, and a wide variety of frameworks.  
This is the first contribution of this paper.  It studies the monetary policy targets used in 
20 OECD countries,
2 all the countries in the OECD with a sufficiently long history of 
                                                 
1    Almeida  (1998)  provides  a  review  of  this  literature,  including  the  expected  implications  of  each 
monetary framework for the stability of financial markets. 
2   The  countries  in  the  sample  are  Australia,  Austria,  Belgium,  Canada,  Denmark,  Finland,  France, 
Germany,  Ireland,  Italy,  Japan,  Netherlands,  New  Zealand,  Norway,  Portugal,  Spain,  Sweden, 
Switzerland, the UK, and the US.      
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‘tolerably  liberalised’  financial  markets,
3  for  a  period  of  40  years,  long  enough  to 
include all the targets usually considered in the literature. 
The  focus  of  most  studies  of  monetary  frameworks  is  on  the  performance  of  the 
economy in terms of inflation and output.  However, price stability and growth are not 
the only objectives of central banks.  As Mishkin (2000) argues, because central banks 
care about output fluctuations and the most serious economic contractions arise when 
there is financial instability, central banks also need to focus on preventing financial 
instability.    However,  many  economists  (e.g.  Folkerts-Landau  and  Garber,  1992, 
Summers, 1991, and Solow, 1982) have expressed doubts as to the compatibility of a 
strict monetary policy rule with central bank acceptance of responsibilities about the 
stability of the financial system. 
The possibility of conflict between macro and microeconomic objectives suggests that 
the evaluation of alternative monetary policy targets will not be complete without an 
analysis of the implications of the adoption of a policy target to the stability of financial 
systems.  In particular, the propensity of a given monetary framework to be associated 
with recurring financial crises has to be seen as a major drawback of that framework. 
The second contribution of this paper is to provide an analysis of the relation between 
policy targets and financial crises, using a historical approach.  The paper assesses the 
likelihood of financial crises under different monetary policy targets, using data for three 
financial assets (exchange rates, interest rates and stock prices) from a panel of OECD 
countries, for the period 1961-2000. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 1 discusses the actual policy targets used by 
central  banks  in  OECD  countries.    Section  2  identifies  the  financial  crises  that  the 
OECD countries in the sample have experienced in the last 40 years of the 20
th century. 
Section 3 is dedicated to the empirical exercise that constitutes the core of the paper: the 
study  of  the  likelihood  of  financial  crises  under  each  policy  target.    Concluding 
comments are provided in Section 4. 
                                                 
3   The expression ‘tolerably liberalised’ is used here in the sense of a financial market that may be 
restricted by regulatory constraints, but these constraints are not enough to render prices meaningless.  
Note that not all countries in the sample fulfilled this condition throughout the whole sample period.      
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1.  MONETARY POLICY TARGETS IN OECD COUNTRIES 
 
1.1.  Rules or discretion? 
The basic choice in the definition of a monetary framework is whether monetary policy 
should  be  guided  by  stable  rules,  or  whether  central  banks  should  be  given  the 
discretion to decide what is the optimal policy at each moment in time.  A monetary rule 
specifies policy actions as a simple function of economic or monetary conditions, and is 
selected as the outcome of a multiperiod optimisation process.  Kydland and Prescott 
(1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983) saw their demonstration of the time-inconsistency 
problem as making the case for a monetary policy rule.  By adopting a rule the central 
bank could pre-commit to avoiding monetary surprises, and the problem of dynamic 
inconsistency  would  disappear.    The  problem  with  a  monetary  rule  is  that  in  an 
uncertain world it is impossible to design ex-ante a rule that would deliver the optimal 
response to all possible contingencies.  In contrast, discretion implies period-by-period 
re-optimisation on the part of the monetary authority, without any prior restrictions on 
the actions that the central bank can take at each date.  This led some authors (e.g., 
Fischer,  1990)  to  argue  that discretion  is preferable to  rules,  because the benefit of 
having  the  flexibility  to  respond  to  unanticipated  contingencies  is  greater  than  any 
advantage gained from pre-commitment to a fixed rule.
4 
As  McCallum  (1999)  points  out,  the  distinction  between  rules  and  discretion  is 
straightforward in the context of the theoretical models of Kydland and Prescott (1977) 
and subsequent writers, but it is less clear when it comes to practical application to the 
behaviour  of  actual  central  banks.    Taylor  (1993)  distinguishes  ‘rule-like’  from 
discretionary behaviour in practice, by describing the former as ‘systematic’ in the sense 
of “methodical, according to a plan”.  This is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition 
for a rule, since the period by period optimisation process of the discretionary central 
                                                 
4   The concept of monetary rule is been used here in the sense of a “targeting rule”, not of a “instrument 
rule”, in the definition of Svensson (2002).      
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bank of Kydland and Prescott (1977) may be presented as a systematic application of a 
formula.  The needed additional criterion for a rule, according to McCallum (1999), is 
that  the  central  bank  takes  account  of  the  private  sector’s  expectational  behaviour, 
committing not to attempt to exploit temporary inflation-output trade-offs.  This could 
be achieved by announcing a (preferably quantified) target, and sticking to it.  The same 
line is taken by Laidler (1997), when he claims that a target value for a variable is one of 
the things we might signify when we speak of a policy rule. 
 
1.2.  The choice of a monetary policy target 
Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999), Cottarelli and Giannini (1997), Goodhart and Viñals 
(1994), McCallum (1999), Mishkin (2000), and the survey by the Federal Reserve Bank 
of  New  York  (1990)  are  some  examples  of  the  vast  literature  reviewing  the  issues 
involved in the choice of a monetary policy target.  A good policy target should be 
reliably under the central bank control, should have a predictable relationship with the 
final objective, and must be capable of affecting the public’s expectations.  Although 
other variables have been proposed (e.g., nominal GNP, interest rates), the variables that 
have  been  widely  used  by  central  banks  as  policy  targets  are  the  inflation  rate,  a 
monetary aggregate or the exchange rate.
5 
The choice of the exchange rate as a target depends on what is perhaps the most basic of 
all monetary policy choices, whether or not to adopt a fixed exchange rate.
6  The initial 
discussion in this area related to the optimal currency area literature began by Mundell 
                                                 
5   It follows from the previous discussion that the expression ‘policy target’ is being used in the sense of 
an ‘intermediate’ or ‘final’ target, that the central bank sets for the medium term and commits to stick to it.  
It does not cover ‘instrument targets’, which are frequently adjusted.  Several central banks have used 
money market interest rates as ‘operating targets’, but not as ‘policy targets’, in the sense being used here. 
Taylor (1993) argues that some central banks have been using interest rate rules, which are a function of 
inflation and output.  No central bank has ever committed to follow a Taylor rule, not even they have 
explicitly admitted that such rules were used. As such, a Taylor rule cannot be considered a policy target 
under the McCallum (1999) definition. 
6   Exchange rate targets do not imply fixed exchange rates.  A crawling peg in which the currency is 
allowed to depreciate at a steady rate is also a form of exchange rate targeting.  Because the implications 
of a crawling peg for the conduct of monetary policy are very similar to that of a fixed exchange rate, at 
least when the depreciation rate is kept unchanged, the discussion in the paper assumes fixed exchange 
rates on the grounds of simplicity.      
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(1961), McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969), and was widely extended in the 1990’s by 
research associated with the move towards monetary integration in Europe (see survey 
in Isard, 1995, ch. 11).  The main problem of a fixed exchange rate is the loss of an 
independent  monetary  policy,  i.e.,  the  loss  of  the  ability  to  use  monetary  policy  to 
achieve  the  desirable  levels  for  the  domestic  macroeconomic  objectives.    The  key 
advantage is its simplicity and clarity, which makes it easily understood by the public.  
An exchange rate peg anchors price inflation for internationally traded goods, and when 
the peg is credible, this helps bring inflation expectations in line with that of the targeted 
country.  It is also easily controllable by the central bank. 
The use of monetary aggregates as intermediary targets become very popular among 
central bankers after the collapse of the fixed exchange rate Bretton-Woods regime, and 
was the subject of intense discussions in the 1970s and 1980s (see Goodhart, 1989, for a 
survey).  A major advantage of money targets is that they enable a central bank to adjust 
its  monetary  policy  to  cope  with  domestic  considerations.    Money  targets  can  also 
provide good anchors for inflation expectations, although not as good as exchange rate 
targets: they are less easily understood by the public, and information about monetary 
aggregates is only known with a lag of a couple of weeks, at least.  However, money 
aggregates can only be good targets if they can be well controlled by the central bank, 
and if there is a strong and reliable relationship between the final objective and the 
targeted aggregate.  These two conditions were seldom verified, and during the 1980s 
most central banks abandoned money targeting. 
The early 1990’s introduced inflation targeting (IT) in the discussion of monetary policy 
targets.  IT has been the topic of vast economic research, of which the books edited by 
Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin and Posen (2000), Leiderman and Svensson (1995), and 
Haldane (1995) are some examples.  The main advantages of IT are that it provides the 
best  anchor  for  inflation  expectations,  and  it  uses  more  information  than  money 
targeting; the main drawback is that the control of the central bank over inflation might 
be less than what is required in a good target (Almeida and Goodhart, 1998).      
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1.3.  Monetary policy targets in practice 
Although in theory the distinction between the different targets is clear, it becomes less 
obvious when one has to classify the frameworks addopted by actual central banks.  For 
example, some central banks do not announce any targets, even though policy decisions 
are  based  on  one  (and  this  may  be  widely  recognised  by  private  agents).
7    Others 
announce a target, but policy decisions are not guided by that variable, or they may even 
announce more than one target.  Because one of the rationales for adopting a target is its 
effect on  (private sectors’) expectations,  it  is important whether or not the target is 
announced.  But talk is cheap, and announcing a target does not force the central bank to 
take policy actions consistent with its attainment.  What determines policy outcomes is 
the target that drives policy decisions, not the announced one.  Thus, both the actual and 
the announced targets are important, since both will have an effect on the outcome of 
the framework, and potentially on the stability of financial markets.  This paper analyses 
monetary policy frameworks from both points of view. 
The previous discussion on the choice of a monetary policy target identified four basic 
targeting frameworks that central banks in OECD countries have used in the last forty 
years:  exchange  rate  targets  (ET),  money  targets  (MT),  inflation  targets  (IT),  and  a 
framework in which the central bank does not announce a target, that will be designated 
as discretion (DS).
8  
The  use  of  an  exchange  rate  target  does  not  imply  that  the  exchange  rate  is  fixed.  
Exchange rate targets are usually formulated in terms of a central parity, with associated 
fluctuation bands.  As long as the width of the band is strictly positive, the exchange rate 
will not be fixed.  Also, the central parity may be changed; in some ET frameworks 
these changes follow a pre-announced schedule (e.g., crawling peg), while in others they 
occur in irregular occasions and amounts.  Different widths of the fluctuation bands and 
different arrangements for changes in the central parity are likely to be associated with 
                                                 
7   An example was the Austrian Central Bank, which before 1995 had an unpublished target for the 
schilling/DEM exchange rate. 
8  If the central bank announces a target but it accepts misses on a discretionary basis, it will be classified 
as having announced a target, but as a discretionary central bank in practice (because it is not committed 
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different levels  of stability in financial markets, so this paper distinguishes between 
several ET frameworks.  In particular, multilateral exchange rate agreements, like the 
Bretton-Woods  agreement  (BW),  the  European  ‘snake’ (SK), and the exchange rate 
mechanism  of  the  European  Monetary  System  (ERM),  are  treated  separately  from 
unilateral exchange rate targets (XT).  In addition, the original ERM arrangement (OR), 
with fluctuation bands of ±2.25% (±6% for some countries), is distinguished from the 
ERM with ‘wide bands’ (fluctuation margins of ±15%) that emerged after August 1993 
(WR). 
 
1.4.  40 years of monetary policy targets in OECD countries 
Figures 1.1 and 1.2 summarize the policy targets used by the central banks in 20 OECD 
countries, which are fully described in the Appendix. The figures and the appendix are 
the first contribution of this paper: they provide a systematic and detailed classification 
of the monetary policy targets used by OECD central banks since 1960, including the 
discussion of whether the announced target was the actual target.
9 
The  countries  in  the  sample  were  all  part of  the  Bretton-Woods arrangement (BW) 
during the 1960’s, under which the main objective of monetary policy was to maintain a 
fixed exchange rate against the USD.
10  In 1970 three countries decided to suspend their 
participation in the Bretton-Woods arrangement, and many others followed in August 
1971, after the suspension of the convertibility of the USD into gold. In December 1971, 
                                                                                                                                               
to follow the target it set). 
9   Some of the sources of information used are official (e.g., central banks, IMF), others are not.  It was 
assumed  that  the  target described  in  the official  sources  was  the announced one,  and that  the  target 
described in the non-official sources was the actual target, when different.  Some of latter descriptions 
might represent subjective ex-post opinions of the authors, but it was assumed that they represent the 
contemporaneous view of private market agents. A large part of this work was conducted before Cottarelli 
and Giannini (1997) became available, and the classification used in this paper differs from theirs. Their 
database covers a wider range of countries, but it is less detailed than the one in the Appendix, and they do 
not distinguish between actual and announced targets.  Nevertheless, the two databases are consistent, and 
no contradiction was found between the two. 
10   The USD had a fixed parity to gold.  Under a fixed exchange rate target, with perfect capital mobility, 
monetary policy is totally constrained by the external objective, and cannot be used to achieve domestic 
objectives.  In the Bretton-Woods period, exchange controls and limited capital mobility allowed some 
independence  in  monetary  policies,  but,  nevertheless,  the  policy  framework  was  basically  set  by  the 
regime’s constraints.      
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there was an attempt to restore the Bretton-Woods system (the Smithsonian agreement), 
with a general devaluation relative to gold, and the widening of the fluctuation bands, 
but by early 1973 the Bretton-Woods system had been abandoned.
11 
After 1973 the diversity of monetary policy frameworks increased significantly. Eight 
countries opted for a discretionary framework (DS), by floating their currency and not 
adopting any new target. Five countries opted to maintain the peg to the dollar, now 
unilaterally (XT). A third group of seven european countries tried to limit the variability 
of  their  exchange  rate  against  the  DEM,  under  the  European  Common  Margin 
Arrangement, also known as the “snake” (SK), a multilateral system of fixed exchange 
rates, with fluctuation bands of 2.25%. The “snake” would be replaced in 1979 by the 
European  Monetary  System  (OR),  another  system  of  fixed  exchange  rates,  with 
fluctuation bands of 2.25% or 6%. Initially the ERM was a constraint on the monetary 
policy of only six countries, but in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s three other countries 
joined.
12 
Unsatisfaction with the lack of a clear target for monetary policy, and in some cases 
with unilateral pegs, led to the adoption by 11 central banks of money targets (MT) in 
the second half of the 1970’s. However, money targets were not seen to be a successful 
framework,  and  during  the  1980’s  most  countries  abandoned  monetary  targeting, 
generally for a discretionary policy. In the early 1990’s inflation targeting become a 
popular monetary policy framework, having been adopted by eight central banks. 
Meanwhile, in 1993 the fluctuation bands in the ERM were widened to 15%, under 
pressure from speculative attacks.  With such wide bands the external constraint on 
monetary policy is very weak, and it could be argued that this framework was more 
discretionary than exchange rate targeting. Nevertheless, most countries in the ERM 
decided to limit the variability of their exchange rates to narrower bands, subjecting 
                                                 
11  In the classification used in this paper it was considered that the period of August-December 1971 was 
still part of the Bretton-Woods system, because all the events related to exchange rates during this period 
were a direct consequence of the system. 
12  Germany participated in the “snake” and in the ERM, but was not classified as having an exchange rate 
target because the DEM was the anchor currency of both systems, which allowed the Bundesbank to 
follow an independent monetary policy. 
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their monetary policy to the external constraint.  Finally in January 1999 the creation of 








                                                                                                                                               
 
13  In the empirical work, the target adopted by the European Central Bank was associated with Germany, 
the largest country in the Euro area.      
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Figure 1.1: ANNOUNCED MONETARY POLICY TARGETS IN SELECTED OECD COUNTRIES
1960 1970 1980
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Figure 1.2: ACTUAL MONETARY POLICY TARGETS IN SELECTED OECD COUNTRIES
1960 1970 1980
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2.  FINANCIAL CRISES 
Central banks concerned with the stability of the financial system should be concerned 
with  situations  when  financial  institutions  may  suffer  large  losses  due  to  large  and 
sudden variations in financial prices, a situation that could be described as a ‘financial 
crisis’. There is no established definition of what constitutes a financial crisis, but most 
people  would  know  one  when  they  see  it.  As  long  as  a  large  number  of  financial 
institutions find themselves in distress due to adverse movements in financial markets, 
one could say that there is a financial crisis.  
 
2.1.  Identification of financial crises 
Given the purposes of this paper, a ‘financial crisis’ is described as a period when the 
value of the portfolios of financial institutions could decline significantly due to large 
and sudden variations in the prices of the financial assets included in these portfolios. 
The financial variables that have the largest impact on the value of financial institutions’ 
portfolios are exchange rates, interest rates, or share prices. As such, whenever these 
financial variables change adversely by very large amounts in a short period of time, one 
could say that there is a financial crisis. 
Following this approach, ‘financial crises’ are defined as periods of abrupt and very 
large adverse changes in exchange rates, interest rates, or share prices, so large and 
abrupt that its occurrence is highly unlikely and potentially disruptive of the stability of 
the financial system. Adverse changes are large declines in share prices, large increases 
in interest rates, or a large depreciation of the exchange rate. Most financial institutions 
hold  large  portfolios  of  shares,  implying  that  declines  in  share  prices  have  a  direct 
impact in the value of their assets. Furthermore, declines in share prices might also have 
a indirect impact on the value of the assets, since it reduces the value of the collateral of 
any loans that might be collateralised by shares. On the other hand, financial institutions 
tend to hold liabilities with shorter maturities than their assets.  Abrupt increases in 
interest rates may cause a mismatch between the cost of the liabilities and the return on 
the  assets,  serious  enough  to  lead  to  the  collapse  of  the  institution.  Finally,  many 
financial  institutions  have  large  foreign  exchange  liabilities,  and  an  unexpected      
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depreciation of the exchange rate will increase significantly the value of those liabilities. 
In order to identify financial crises, one still needs to define what is a ‘large and abrupt’ 
change in an asset price. The criterion used in this paper is to consider as a financial 
crisis any price change that is ‘very large’ relative to the past history of price changes for 
that asset, as measured by the ratio of the forecast error of a rolling ARMA model over 
its  standard  deviation.    Since  the  change  has  to  be  ‘abrupt’,  price  changes  were 
measured over relatively short periods, using monthly data.
 14 
 
2.2.  Data and methodology 
The  financial  asset  prices  series  are  monthly  data  for  the  period  1957:1-2000:12, 
obtained  from  the  IMF  International  Financial  Statistics  and  OECD  historical 
databases.  The exchange rate data are IFS’s SDR end period exchange rates.
15  Bilateral 
exchange rates are influenced by factors originating in the two countries involved, and 
the  use  of  SDR  exchange  rates  reduces  the  influence  of  external  elements  in  the 
analysis, since the value of the SDR is a composite of five different exchange rates.
16  
Domestic  factors,  like  the  monetary  policy  targets  analysed  in  this  paper,  are  more 
closely related to the SDR exchange rate than to any bilateral exchange rate, which also 
depends  on  other  factors  unrelated  to  domestic  conditions,  like,  for  example,  the 
framework adopted by the central bank of the other country.
17  Interest rates are money 
market call rates, mostly from the IFS database.
18 The share price data correspond to the 
                                                 
14  Even though large asset price changes occurring gradually over the medium term may have a serious 
impact on the economy, they are less likely to cause significant disruption in financial institutions. If the 
change  in  asset  prices  occurs  over  the  medium  term,  financial  institutions  can  gradually  adjust  their 
portfolios, or hedge against potential losses. This is why the analysis is based on month-to-month changes 
in asset prices. 
15  Measured in terms of national currency units per SDR. 
16  During the Bretton-Woods period, the value of the SDR was defined in terms of gold. 
17   Since the value of the SDR is a weighted average of five currencies, SDR exchange rates are not 
immune to external factors, in particular those influencing the currencies with the larger weights in the 
SDR basket.  However, their influence is smaller than in any given bilateral exchange rate. 
18  The exceptions are: Canada (IFS, Treasury Bill rate); Ireland (OECD, Interest Rate on Call Money, end 
period); New Zealand (OECD, 90 Day Bank Bill Rate); Portugal (IFS, Average Interest Rate on Time 
Deposits); Spain (OECD, Interest Rate on Call Money, end period); Switzerland (Datastream, Interest 
Rate on 3 Month Swiss Franc Deposits in London, end period). Data were not available for the following 
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main national stock market indices.
19 
The criterion defined in the previous subsection to identify a financial crisis, is any price 
change that is ‘very large’ relative to the past history of price changes for that asset, as 
measured by the ratio of the forecast error of a rolling ARMA model over its standard 
deviation.  The  basic  asset  price  variable  in  this  exercise  was  the  (continuously 
compounded) percentage short term change in the asset price for country i in period t, 
rit, measured by the first difference of the log of the asset price, Pit, multiplied by 100, 
  rit =(log Pit  - log Pi,t-1) x 100  2.1 
ARMA models, chosen according to the Schwarz criterion, were then fitted to each of 
the ri series.  Subsequently, rolling ARMA models were estimated using data for the 
previous 3 years, and a forecast based on the estimated model, fit, was computed for 
each period.  The indicator used to identify financial crises, TFit, was computed as the 
ratio of the forecast given by the rolling ARMA model and its standard deviation 
  TFit = fit / standard deviation (fit)  2.2 
If the indicator TFit was larger than 4.0 it would identify a ‘large and abrupt’ financial 
asset price change in country i in period t.
20  Given that one has defined ‘financial 
crises’ as periods of ‘large and abrupt’ adverse changes in exchange rates, interest rates, 
or share prices, two additional steps were required for the identification of the financial 
crises.  First, one had to identify which changes were ‘adverse’.  These were defined as 
exchange rate depreciations larger than 2%, interest rate increases of at least 100 basis 
points, or declines in share prices.
21  Second, when two or more very large price changes 
                                                                                                                                               
periods  and  countries:  Austria,  France,  Germany,  Italy,  Netherlands,  and  Sweden:  until  1959:12; 
Switzerland: until 1962:12; New Zealand, Norway, and Spain: until 1963:12; Australia, until 1969:06. 
19    International  Financial  Statistics,  Share  Prices  (line  62),  except:  Denmark  (IFS,  Share  Prices: 
Industrial, line 62A); Germany (OECD, Share Price Index, CDAX, monthly average); Portugal (OECD, 
Share Prices – Lisbon Stock Exchange). Data were not available for the following periods and countries: 
Australia,  UK:  until  1957:12;  Germany:  until  1959:12;  New  Zealand  and  Spain:  until  1960:12; 
Switzerland: until 1961:12; Portugal: until 1980:12. 
20  The cut-off value (4.0) is an arbitrary number. It was chosen such that the total number of crises 
identified in the sample would be around 200, which corresponds roughly to the occurrence of a crisis 
every 4 years in each country. 
21 If a small change in exchange rates or interest rates occurred after a long period during which those 
rates were fixed, it could be identified as ‘large and abrupt’ by the methodology described above. A 25 
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were identified inside three consecutive months, it was assumed that these refer to the 
same financial crisis. 
 
2.3.  40 years of financial crises in OECD countries 
Table  2.1  presents  the  financial  crises  identified  using  this  methodology,  for  the 
countries in the sample, and for the foreign exchange markets, money markets and stock 
exchanges.  In the foreign exchange market a total of 73 crises were identified, with 
Germany  being  the  country  with  fewest  crises  (only  one,  in  December  1971, 
corresponding to problems in the Bretton-Woods system) and Sweden being the country 
with most crises (seven, five occurring during the 70’s and early 80’s, and two in the 
early 90’s).  In the money market, the total number of crises identified was 74, ranging 
from zero in Australia to nine in Ireland (seven occurring during the 70’s and early 80’s, 
and two in the early 90’s).  Finally, 43 crises in the stock markets were identified, 
ranging from one in Finland, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and New Zealand, to four in 
Belgium, Norway, and Spain.  
In some periods, financial crises are identified in several countries simultaneously. The 
methodology used identified a exchange rate crisis for six countries in the last quarter of 
1967, when there was a rearrangement of parities under the Bretton-Woods system. The 
problems in the Bretton-Woods system in December 1971 were identified as crisis in all 
the countries in the sample, except France. Money market crises in September 1992 
were identified in seven countries, reflecting the sharp increases in interest rates some 
central banks were forced to adopt in response to problems originating in the Exchange 
Rate Mechanism of the European Monetary System. Finally, the stock market crashes of 
October  1987  and  August  1998  were  identified  as  crises  in  15  and  9  countries, 
respectively. 
                                                                                                                                               
basis point increase in interest rates, or an exchange rate devaluation of 0.5% are unlikely to jeopardize 
the financial stability, even if they are unexpected. As such, only devaluations larger than 2% or interest 
rate increases of at least 100 basis points were considered to be financial crises.      
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Table 2.1  Crises in financial markets of OECD countries 
  Foreign exchange market  Money market  Stock market 
Country  #  Dates   #  Dates   #  Dates  
Austria  2  71:12, 78:11  1  69:12  2  89:11, 98:08 
Australia  5  71:12, 74:09, 76:11, 
83:03, 85:02 
0    2  80:03, 87:10 
Belgium  3  71:12, 78:11, 82:02  3  69:07, 81:04, 93:08  4  73:12, 81:06, 87:11, 
98:08  
Canada  4  61:06, 71:12, 73:02, 
76:11 
3  74:04, 79:10, 92:09  3  80:03, 87:10, 98:08 
Denmark  2  67:11, 71:12  4  67:12, 73:12, 89:10, 
93:02 
3  64:01, 84:05, 92:8 
Finland  6  67:10, 71:12, 77:04, 
82:10, 91:11, 92:09 
5  71:06, 75:09, 77:05, 
83:05, 86:08 
1  96:07 
France  3  69:08, 73:08, 82:06  3  81:05, 87:01, 92:09  2  82:03, 87:11 
Germany  1  71:12   2  69:06, 73:03   1  87:11 
Ireland  4  67:11, 71:12, 72:06, 
93:02 
9  72:06, 73:03, 73:06, 
74:06, 74:09, 79:06, 
83:03, 92:09, 92:11 
2  87:11, 98:08 
Italy  4  71:12, 73:02, 80:03, 
92:09 
7  69:05, 70:02, 74:06, 
76:03, 79:12, 86:02, 
92:09  
1  86:06 
Japan  2  71:12, 74:01  2  61:03, 80:03  2  61:10, 70:05  
Netherl.  2  71:12, 78:11   4  73:12, 76:08, 86:05, 
88:07  
1  87:11  
NZ  6  67:11, 71:12, 75:08, 
83:03, 84:07, 98:08 
1  85:03   1  87:11  
Norway  3  71:12, 86:05, 97:04   6  69:09, 73:10, 77:12, 
86:05, 92:09, 98:08  
4  62:06, 87:11, 90:12, 
98:08 
Portugal  4  71:12, 77:02, 82:06, 
83:06 
6  73:12, 77:08, 89:05, 
90:10, 91:04, 92:09 
2  87:11, 88:02 
Spain  6  67:11, 71:12, 76:02, 
77:07, 82:12, 92:09 
2  78:08, 87:04  4  73:11, 80:04, 87:10, 
98:08 
Sweden  7  71:12, 73:02, 77:08, 
81:09, 82:10, 91:06, 
92:11 
4  67:09, 90:02, 91:12, 
92:09  
2  87:10, 98:08  
Switzer.  2  71:12, 78:11  5  74:01, 79:10, 81:02, 
89:12, 99:10 
2  87:10, 98:08 
UK  4  67:11, 71:12, 72:06, 
92:09  
4  64:12, 78:01, 84:07, 
74:02  
2  87:11, 98:08 
US  3  71:12, 73:02, 78:10  3  73:07, 79:10, 80:03   2  80:03, 87:10 
Total  73    74    43        
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3.  ARE MONETARY POLICY TARGETS AND FINANCIAL CRISES RELATED? 
The  goal  of  this  paper  is  to  study  the  stability  of  financial  markets  under  different 
monetary  policy  targets.  This  section  investigates  whether  financial  crises  are  more 
likely to occur under certain monetary policy frameworks. 
 
3.1.  Policy targets and financial crises 
A simple analysis of the number of the financial crises under each monetary policy 
target suggests that financial crises are more likely to occur under some frameworks 
than others. The data in Table 3.1 reveal that very few crises occurred under inflation 
targeting or the wide ERM arrangement. On the other hand, the number of crises that 
occurred under the exchange rate targeting frameworks seems to be large.  
Table 3.1  Policy targets and number of financial crises 
Model  Exchange rates  Interest rates  Share prices 
Target  Announced  Actual  Announced  Actual  Announced  Actual 
Discretion  7  8  9  9  7  6 
Money  9  5  14  6  9  5 
Inflation  1  1  1  2  5  6 
XT  18  25  16  25  4  10 
BW  27  27  12  12  5  5 
ERM  6  4  17  15  9  10 
Wide ERM  0  0  0  0  3  0 
Snake  5  3  5  5  1  1 
 
 
3.2.  The logit model  
A more formal analysis of the relationship between the occurrence of a crisis and the 
policy target the central bank was using when the crisis erupted, may be achieved by the 
estimation of a binary choice model, using a logistic distribution.
22  The logit model 
                                                 
22  The logistic distribution (logit model) was preferred to the normal distribution (probit model) because 
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used is of the type of equation 3.1: 









￿ ￿ g b   3.1 
where CRit is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if a crisis occurs in country i in 
period t, S
m
it are variables taking the value 1 if country i adopted target m in period t, g 
and bm are parameters to be estimated, and l(.) denotes the logistic distribution.  This 
model was estimated independently for each of the 3 types of financial assets under 
analysis (exchange rates, interest rates and share prices), using a quarterly periodicity.
23 
 
3.3.  Results of the extended logit model 
The logit models explaining the likelihood of crises as a function of the policy target 
adopted by the central bank when the crisis was declared (equation 3.1) were estimated 
using, alternatively, the actual and the announced targets, and in both cases ‘IT’ was set 
as the base framework.
24  Table 3.2 presents the estimates of the logit parameters, while 
Table 3.3 provides some statistical analysis of the results. 
The models for the foreign exchange market are highly significant, showing that there 
are significant differences in the probability of an exchange rate crisis associated with 
different policy targets, with the significance being higher for the model with the actual 
targets. The parameters of the models suggest that the probability of crisis is higher for 
the  exchange  rate  targeting  frameworks,  significantly  so  for  XT,  BW  and  SK.  The 
probability of crisis under IT is lower than under any other framework, but this is not 
                                                                                                                                               
the  logistic  distribution  has  fatter  tails  than  the  normal  distribution,  and  thus  is  more  appropriate  to 
describe the data under analysis.  Both models produce similar results when the estimated probabilities are 
close to 50%, but the results may differ widely across models when the estimated probabilities are very 
large or very small (Greene, 2002, ch. 21).  Nevertheless, estimates of probit models were also calculated, 
and it was found that all the qualitative results were similar to the ones presented here (details of the 
estimations may be obtained from the author). 
23  The choice of a quarterly periodicity is a consequence of the procedure used, since it does not identify 
two crises occurring on two consecutive calendar months.  This rules out the use of a monthly periodicity.  
Note that much care was taken to ensure that the occurrence of a crisis was associated with the target in 
place when the crisis started. 
24  I.e., l(g) is the estimated probability that a crisis will occur under IT, while l(g+bm) (m¹IT) is the 
estimated probability that a crisis will occur when the central bank is using target m.      
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significant relative to MT and DS frameworks. 
Table 3.2  Estimates of the extended logit models 
Model  Exchange rates  Interest rates  Share prices 
Target  Announced  Actual  Announced  Actual  Announced  Actual 
g  -5.429  -5.656  -5.429  -4.959  -3.802  -3.847 
  -5.42  -5.65  -5.42  -6.99  -8.41  -9.32 
b (MT)  1.346  1.541  1.797  1.031  -0.281  -0.268 
  1.27  1.40  1.73  1.26  -0.50  -0.44 
b (DS)  1.475  1.772  1.732  1.196  -0.152  -0.330 
  1.38  1.67  1.63  1.52  -0.26  -0.57 
b (XT)  2.304  2.491  2.180  1.795  -0.861  -0.259 
  2.23  2.44  2.11  2.43  -1.27  -0.50 
b (BW)  1.962  2.189  1.134  0.664  -1.376  -1.332 
  1.92  2.14  1.09  0.87  -2.16  -2.19 
b (SK)  2.126  1.934  2.126  1.765  -1.139  -0.990 
  1.93  1.67  1.93  2.09  -1.03  -0.91 
b (OR)  1.250  1.000  2.320  1.651  0.036  0.121 
  1.15  0.89  2.25  2.18  0.06  0.23 
b (WT)          0.097   
          0.13   
Notes: The table presents the estimates of the parameters in the logit model given by equation 3.1., using ‘IT’ as the base 
framework.  The dependent variable is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if a crisis in the financial market (named in the 
heading  of  the  column)  of  country  i=1  to  20  occurred  in  quarter  t=1961:1  to  2000:4.    The  explanatory  variables  are 
alternatively, the announced or the actual policy targets.  Values in italics are t-statistics; at the 5% (10%) level, the critical 
value for the t-statistics is 1.96 (1.67).  Since the estimation procedure does not converge when the dependent variable 
always takes the value 0 when one of the explanatory variables takes the value 1, some models had to be estimated without 
the observations corresponding to the WT, for which no crises occurred. 
The results of the models for the money market are similar to the foreign exchange 
market models. Both models for interest rates are highly significant, again showing that 
there are significant differences in the probability of an interest rate crisis associated 
with different policy targets. However, in this case the significance of both models (with 
the actual and with the announced targets) is very similar. The parameters of the models 
suggest  again  that  the  probability  of  crisis  is  higher  for the exchange  rate targeting 
frameworks, but now the difference is significant for XT, SK, and OR. The probability 
of crisis under IT is again lower than under any other framework 
None of the models for the stock market is significant, suggesting that monetary policy 
targets are not relevant to the likelihood of stock market crises. However, the tests of 
equality  of  coefficients  suggest  that  under  the  Bretton-Woods  regime  stock  market 
crises were significantly less likely.      
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Table 3.3  Statistical inference from the extended logit models 
  Exchange rates  Interest rates  Share prices 
  Announced  Actual  Announced  Actual  Announced  Actual 
Predicted probabilities           
Discretion  1.88  2.02  2.42  2.27  1.88  1.51 
  (0.71)  (0.71)  (0.80)  (0.75)  (0.71)  (0.61) 
Money  1.66  1.61  2.58  1.93  1.66  1.61 
  (0.55)  (0.71)  (0.68)  (0.78)  (0.55)  (0.71) 
Inflation  0.44  0.35  0.44  0.70  2.18  2.09 
  (0.44)  (0.35)  (0.44)  (0.35)  (0.44)  (0.35) 
XT  4.21  4.05  3.74  4.05  0.94  1.62 
  (0.97)  (0.79)  (0.92)  (0.79)  (0.47)  (0.51) 
ERM  1.51  0.94  4.27  3.53  2.26  2.35 
  (0.61)  (0.46)  (1.01)  (0.90)  (0.75)  (0.74) 
Wide ERM  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  2.40  0.00 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (1.37)  (0.00) 
Snake  3.55  2.36  3.55  3.94  0.71  0.79 
  (1.56)  (1.35)  (1.56)  (1.73)  (0.71)  (0.78) 
BW  3.03  3.03  1.35  1.35  0.56  0.56 
  (0.57)  (0.57)  (0.39)  (0.39)  (0.25)  (0.25) 
Joint tests 
1. No difference among non-exchange rate targeting (ET) frameworks 
c(2)  1.91  2.78  3.02  2.33  0.25  0.36 
2. No difference among non-ET frameworks and no difference among ERM and XT frameworks 
c(.)  c(5) = 6.9  c(5) = 10.7  c(5) = 14.1  c(5) = 13.3  c(6) = 8.6  c(5) = 7.8 
3. Significance of the model (all b(m)=0) 
c(.)  c(6) = 16.1  c(6) = 21.6   c(6) = 19.1  c(6) = 19.4  c(7) = 11.5  c(6) =9.8 
Tests of equality of coefficients (rejections of the null) 
5%  MX,XO  BO,XO  BX,BO  BX,BO,BS  BO,BD,BW  BO 
10%  XD  MX,XD  MB,BS  MX  MB  MB,BX,BD 
Notes: the results in this table are based on the estimated logit models presented in Table 3.2.  ‘Predicted probabilities’ are 
given by l(g) for ‘IT’, and l(g+b(m)) for the other targets, where l(.) is the logistic distribution. Figures in parenthesis are 
standard errors for the predicted probabilities.  At the 5% (10%) level, the critical value for the c
2 statistics are 5.99 (4.61), 
7.82 (6.25), 9.49 (7.78), 11.07 (9.24), 12.59 (10.64) and 14.07 (12.02), for 2 to 7 degrees of freedom, respectively.  The lines 
for the ‘test of equality of coefficients’ present target pairs (identified by the first letter of each target) for which the null of 
the two coefficients being equal was rejected at the significance level displayed in the first column.  The title of each joint 
test describes the null hypothesis.  Test 1 is performed by imposing the restriction b(MT)=b(DS)=0.  Test 2 adds to the 
restriction in test 1, the restriction b(BW)=b(XT)=b(OR) = b(SK)= b(WT). 
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3.4.  Results of the reduced logit model 
The  results  in  Tables  3.2.  and  3.3  suggest  that  there  are  no  significant  differences 
between the likelihood of crises under MT and DT. They also suggest that there are no 
significant  differences  between  the  different  multilateral  exchange  rate  targeting 
arrangements. As such, the model in equation 3.1 was estimated with only four different 
monetary  policy  frameworks:  inflation  targeting  (IT),  multilateral  exchange  rate 
targeting  (ERT),  unilateral  exchange  rate  targeting  (XT),  and other (MDT,  covering 
money targets and discretion). Tables 3.4 and 3.5 present the results of the estimation of 
the restricted logit models, with IT set as the base framework. 
 
Table 3.4  Estimates of the restricted logit models 
Model  Exchange rates  Interest rates  Share prices 
Target  Announced  Actual  Announced  Actual  Announced  Actual 
g  -5.429  -5.656  -5.429  -4.959  -3.802  -3.847 
  -5.42  -5.65  -5.42  -6.98  -8.41  -9.32 
b (MDT)  1.270  1.677  1.640  1.126  -0.182  -0.302 
  1.23  1.61  1.60  1.49  -0.36  -0.60 
b (ERT)  1.827  1.881  1.714  1.123  -0.745  -0.694 
  1.80  1.85  1.68  1.53  -1.43  -1.44 
b (XT)  2.303  2.491  2.181  1.795  -0.861  -0.259 
  2.23  2.43  2.11  2.43  -1.27  -0.50 
Notes: See Tables 3.2 and 3.3. 
 
The results confirm that the monetary policy framework adopted by the Central Bank 
has a relevant influence in the likelihood of exchange rate and interest rate crises, but 
not in the likelihood of stock market crises. Crises are less likely to occur under IT than 
under any other framework, although the differences to the MDT framework are not 
significant. Crises are more likely to occur under XT, and the difference to all other 
frameworks is significant at the 5% level for the actual targets exchange rate and interest 
rate models.      
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Table 3.5  Statistical inference from the restricted logit models 
  Exchange rates  Interest rates  Share prices 
  Announced  Actual  Announced  Actual  Announced  Actual 
Predicted probabilities           
Inflation  0.44  0.35  0.44  0.70  2.18  2.09 
  0.44  0.35  0.44  0.35  0.44  0.35 
MDT  1.54  1.84  2.21  2.12  1.83  1.55 
  0.38  0.51  0.46  0.54  0.42  0.47 
ERT  2.65  2.24  2.38  2.11  1.05  1.06 
  0.43  0.38  0.40  0.37  0.27  0.26 
XT  4.21  4.05  3.74  4.05  0.94  1.62 
  0.97  0.79  0.92  0.79  0.47  0.51 
Joint tests 
1. No difference among non-ET frameworks and no difference among ERT and XT frameworks 
c(2)  4.17  7.78  4.86  8.36  0.17  1.49 
2. Significance of the model (all b(m)=0) 
c(3)  14.65  15.16  8.63  11.69  4.27  2.60 
Tests of equality of coefficients (rejections of the null) 
5%  DX  DX,EX    DX,EX     
10%  DE,EX           
Notes: See Tables 3.2 and 3.3.  
 
 
4.  CONCLUSIONS 
This paper examined the differences in the stability of the foreign exchange, money, and 
stock markets, associated with the use of alternative monetary policy targets, based on 
data from a panel of 20 OECD countries, for the period 1961-2000. The investigation 
included an analysis of which targets were used by each country in each period of time, 
and a study of the likelihood of financial crises under different policy targets. 
The main conclusion to be drawn is that the choice of monetary policy framework will 
significantly affect stability in financial markets.  The likelihood of crises in foreign 
exchange markets and money markets differ significantly when central banks are using 
alternative policy targets.  Some frameworks appear to be unambiguously preferable      
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from the financial stability perspective. 
The use of inflation targets reduces the likelihood of crises in the foreign exchange and 
money  markets  (relative  to  any  other  framework),  suggesting  that  a  central  bank 
concerned with financial stability should adopt this framework. With a credible inflation 
target there is less uncertainty on the future direction of monetary policy, and thus less 
uncertainty regarding exchange rates and interest rates, reducing the potential for foreign 
exchange or money market crises. 
Another interesting result is that unilateral exchange rate targeting frameworks tend to 
have higher likelihood of foreign exchange and money market crises, consistent with the 
common view that they are more prone to speculative attacks, which may force central 
banks to increase interest rates to defend the exchange rate, sometimes unsuccessfully.  
However, it might be surprising to find out that multilateral exchange rate arrangements 
have lower likelihood of crises than unilateral arrangements.  It would seem that the 
strong discipline of a multilateral arrangement could be a better deterrent to speculation 
than the (soft) domestic constraint of a unilateral exchange rate peg. 
Financial stability ranks high on the list of concerns of the typical central bank, but it is 
seldom the most pressing concern.  It is more likely that the monetary policy framework 
will be chosen according to its effect on inflation (and employment) than on financial 
stability.  Nevertheless, existing research on this area suggests that no framework clearly 
outperforms  the  others.    If  the  effects  of  different  frameworks  on  macroeconomic 
variables do not differ significantly, the choice should be made on the basis of their 
impact  on  financial  stability.    The  evidence  provided  in  this  paper  could  provide 
pertinent guidelines for those situations. 
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Appendix: Monetary Policy Targets in Selected OECD Countries 
This appendix lists the monetary policy targets used by the central banks in the sample, 
during the period 1961-2000.  Unmarked text describes the official target announced by 
the central bank.   Text in square  brackets refers  to the actual (unofficial) target, as 
described  in  the  sources  consulted.    Each  policy  framework  period  starts  in  the 
beginning of the ‘start date’ (i.e., if the start date is ‘1985’ the period is assumed to start 
on  1/1/85),  and  ends  immediately  before  the  beginning  of  the  ‘start  date’  of  the 
following period.  In each period, the policy target is classified with a 2 letter code. The 
first letter refers to the officially announced target, and the second letter to the actual 
target.  The letter code is as follows: 
b  - multilateral exchange rate target, Bretton-Woods arrangement; 
d  - discretionary policy, with no explicit policy target; 
o  - multilateral exchange rate target, original ERM (before August 1993); 
i  - inflation target; 
m - monetary target; 
s  - multilateral exchange rate target, European ‘snake’; 
w - multilateral exchange rate target, ‘wide’ ERM (after August 1993); 
x  - unilateral exchange rate target. 
During the 1960’s, all the countries in the sample were participating in the Bretton-
Woods  arrangement,  which  was  revised  by  the  Smithsonian  agreement  (SA),  in 
December 18, 1971. The table below lists the monetary policy targets adopted after the 
country decided to abandon the Bretton-Woods arrangement. 
 
Start date  Code  Comments 
AUSTRALIA   
1971, Dec 18  xx  USD peg maintained after SA; par value changed 23/12/72, 12/2/73, 9/9/73 
1974, Sep 25  xx  XR peg changed to constant trade-weighted exchange rate index; 
1976, Nov 29  md  XR peg abandoned for managed floating; M targets (or ‘conditional 
projections’) adopted  [but these were never elevated to the centre piece 
of monetary policy]; 
1983, Dec 12  md  managed floating ends; 
1986  dd  M targets abandoned; no intermediate targets adopted (discretion); 
1993  ii  IT adopted. 
AUSTRIA   
1971, Aug 15  xx  USD peg abandoned; CB pledged to ‘maintain XR stability against main 
European currencies, especially of the large industrialised neighbours’  
[implicit DEM peg]; 
1981  xx  [implicit DEM peg becomes more restrictive, with smaller XR fluctuations 
allowed] 
1995, Jan 9  wo  ERM participation; 
1999, Jan 1    Euro adopted. 
BELGIUM   
1971, Dec 18  bb  narrower margins of fluctuation (1%) with Dutch guilder after SA 
1972, Apr 24  ss  Snake participation; 
1979, Mar 13  oo  ERM participation; 
1990, Jun 1  oo  [implicit DEM peg]; 
1993, Aug 2  wo  ERM margins widened to 15% [but implicit DEM peg maintained]; 
1999, Jan 1    Euro adopted.      
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CANADA   
1962, May  bb  Joined BW (before the XR was floating); 
1970, May 31  dx  floated XR [but the authorities main concern remains XR stability]; 
1975, Nov 6  mm  M targets announced; 
1978, 4
th qrt  mx  [worries about monetarism; M targets continue to be announced, but XR 
stabilisation becomes the main concern; implicit effective XR peg]; 
1982, Nov  dx  M targets formally abandoned; no intermediate target adopted; 
1984, 2
nd qrt  dd  [implicit effective XR peg abandoned]; 
1988, Jan  di  price stability becomes primary objective; 
1991, Feb 26  ii  IT adopted. 
DENMARK   
1972, May 1  ss  Snake participation; 
1972, Jun 23  bb  Snake participation abandoned; 
1972, Oct 10  ss  Snake participation rejoined; 
1979, Mar 13  oo  ERM participation; 
1993, Aug 2  ww  ERM margins widened to 15%; 
1999, Jan 1  oo  Joins EMS2. 
FINLAND   
1973, June 4  dx  USD peg formally abandoned [but XR remains the main concern]; 
1977, Nov 1  xx  Effective XR peg adopted; 
1991, Jun 7  xx  Peg changed to ECU; 
1992, Sep 8  dd  ECU peg abandoned; 
1993, Feb  ii  IT adopted; 
1996, Oct  ww  ERM participation; 
1999, Jan 1    Euro adopted. 
FRANCE   
1972, May 1  sd  Snake participation [but policy was discretionary, geared towards domestic 
objectives, with equilibrium assured by XR adjustments]; 
1974, Jan 19  dd  Snake participation abandoned; 
1975, Jul 10  sd  Snake participation rejoined [but policy remained discretionary]; 
1976, Mar 15  mm  Snake participation abandoned; M2 target announced; 
1979, Mar 13  od  ERM participation [M2 targets retained, but these were frequently missed; 
policy was discretionary, with XR peg defended through capital controls 
and frequent devaluations]; 
1984, 4
th qtr  oo  [XR stability becomes primary concern]; 
1993, Aug 2  ww  ERM margins widened to 15%. 
1999, Jan 1    Euro adopted. 
GERMANY   
1970, May  dd  USD peg suspended; 
1971, Dec 18  bb  USD peg resumed, after SA; 
1973, Mar 19  dm  USD peg abandoned; Snake participation [but participation in European XR 
agreements was never a binding constraint for German monetary policy; 
M targeting attempted, but not announced]; 
1974, Dec  mm  M target announced. 
1999, Jan 1  ii  Euro adopted; ECB adopts two pillar framework, with targets for inflation 
and M3 [but second pillar never played a role in policy decisions] 
IRELAND   
1972, Jun 23  xx  1:1 parity with GBP maintained, after GBP abandons USD peg; 
1978, Dec 18  dx  GBP parity formally abandoned [but maintained in practice]; 
1979, Mar 13  oo  ERM participation; 
1993, Aug 2  wo  ERM margins widened to 15% [but policy is still aimed at maintaining the 
DEM peg]; 
1999, Jan 1    Euro adopted. 
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ITALY   
1972, May 1  sd  Snake participation [but interest rate policy was not consistent with XR 
commitments; instead the CB resorted to capital controls and a 2-tier XR 
system]; 
1973, Feb 12  dd  Snake participation abandoned; 
1974, Mar 22  md  Total Domestic Credit expansion adopted as intermediate target [under 
pressure from the IMF; in practice, targets were not observed]; 
1979, Mar 13  od  ERM participation [but interest rate policy was still inconsistent with XR 
commitments; it is arguable whether ERM membership was a serious 
constraint on policy]; 
1984  om  M2 target adopted [but TDC target not abandoned; conflict with XR target 
settled with the imposition of capital controls]; 
1987  oo  [policy aimed first and foremost at maintaining XR stability; M2 targets not 
abandoned, but were not pursued rigidly]; 
1992, Sep 17  mw  ERM participation suspended; M2 becomes intermediate target [but XR is 
also monitored closely]; 
1996, Nov 24  ww  ERM participation resumed; 
1999, Jan 1    Euro adopted. 
JAPAN   
1973, Feb 12  dd  USD peg abandoned [no explicit policy target adopted]; 
1975, Jul  dm  [M2 used as intermediate target, but not announced]; 
1978, Jul  mm  M2 ‘forecasts’ announced [these were not ‘targets’, but represented the 
movements in M2 the CB was willing to accept]; 
1990  dd  [CB allowed for increased variability of M growth]; no intermediate targets; 
CB pays attention to international financial conditions and the 
maintenance of an adequate XR. 
NETHERLANDS   
1970, May  dx  USD peg suspended [peg to DEM maintained]; 
1971, Dec 18  bb  USD peg resumed; narrower margins of fluctuation (1%) with Belgium 
franc; 
1972, Apr 24  ss  Snake participation; 
1979, Mar 13  oo  ERM participation; 
1984  oo  [unpublished DEM target of 1.12/1.13 NLG/DEM]; 
1993, Aug 2  oo  ERM margins widened to 15%, but not for the NLG/DEM [unpublished  
DEM target is not affected]; 
1999, Jan 1    Euro adopted. 
NEW ZEALAND   
1973, Jul 9  xx  effective XR peg adopted; 
1979, Jun  xx  effective XR crawling peg adopted; 
1982, Jun 22  xx  effective XR fixed peg adopted; 
1985, Mar 4  dd  effective XR peg abandoned [no explicit target adopted; checklist approach 
in conducting monetary policy]; 
1988, Jun 1  di  price stability becomes primary objective; 
1990, Feb 1  ii  IT adopted. 
NORWAY   
1972, May 23  ss  Snake participation; 
1978, Dec 12  xx  end of Snake participation; effective XR peg adopted; 
1990, Oct 19  xx  ECU peg, with fluctuation bands of ±2.25%; 
1992, Dec 10  dx  ECU peg abandoned; policy aimed at a broadly stable XR; 
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PORTUGAL   
1973, Feb 12  xx  USD peg changed to effective XR fixed peg; 
1976  xd  [Frequent revisions to effective XR peg]; 
1977, Aug 26  xx  Effective XR crawling peg adopted; 
1979  mx  Annual targets for broad money (L-) set by Bank of Portugal [but concern 
over the XR dominated policy] 
1990, October  xo  [ERM shadowing]; 
1992, April  oo  ERM participation (with ±6% bands); 
1993, Aug 2  wo  ERM bands widened [but XR flexibility is limited by the CB]; 
1999, Jan 1    Euro adopted. 
SPAIN   
1974, Jan 22  dm  USD peg abandoned; [explicit use of M3 intermediate target, but targets are 
not made public]; 
1977, May 2  mm  M3 targets announced; 
1984  mx  change to liquid assets targeting [importance of M targets gradually 
downgraded; concern for XR gradually increasing; initially concern was 
for effective XR (1984-85), then for index of EEC countries’ XR (1986-
87), finally for DEM/ESP (1988-89)]; 
1989, Jun 19  oo  ERM participation (with ±6% bands); [liquid assets targets were not 
abandoned, but XR target took precedence]; 
1993, Aug 2  ww  ERM margins widened to 15%; 
1995, Jan 1  ii  IT adopted; 
1999, Jan 1    Euro adopted. 
SWEDEN   
1973, Mar 19  ss  Snake participation; 
1977, Aug 29  xx  Snake participation abandoned; effective XR peg adopted; 
1991, May 17  xx  ECU peg adopted, with fluctuation margins of ±1.5%; 
1992, Nov 19  dd  ECU peg abandoned; no target adopted; 
1993, Jan 15  ii  IT adopted. 
SWITZERLAND   
1973, Jan 23  dd  USD peg abandoned; 
1975  mm  M1 target adopted [but the XR is an important concern, and in periods of 
large pressures in forex markets, the XR goal may take precedence over 
the M target]; 
1978, Oct 1  xx  DEM target announced, M1 target suspended; 
1979, Jun 25  xx  [return to M targeting, but not announced; XR concerns still dominate 
policy]; 
1980  mx  return to announced M targets, but target changed to M0 [XR concerns still 
dominate policy]; 
1982, Jan 3  mm  [return to domestic concerns; importance of XR downgraded]; 
1988, Jan 6  md  definition of M0 changed [M target followed less rigidly]; 
1991  di  M0 target for 1991 not announced; CB emphasises the XR oriented nature 
of policy, but refrained from defining targets; policy set to be consistent 
with 1% inflation rate [implicit IT]. 
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UNITED KINGDOM   
1972, Jun 23  dd  USD peg abandoned (discretionary policy); Snake participation from May 1 
to June 26, 1972; 
1973, 4
th qtr  dm  [informal M3 target adopted]; 
1976, July  md  M target announced [under IMF pressure; targets were not taken as a serious 
constraint on policy, and were consistently overshot]; 
1979, June 12  mm  [new government more committed to £M3 targets]; 
1982, Mar  md  £M3 target de-emphasised; targets for M1 and PSL2 also adopted 
[discretionary policy in practice]; 
1985  dd  £M3 target suspended; 
1987, Mar  dx  [unpublished DEM target adopted]; 
1988, Mar  dd  [unpublished DEM target abandoned]; 
1990, Oct 8  oo  ERM participation (with ±6% bands); 
1992, Sep 17  ii  ERM participation abandoned; IT adopted (Oct 8). 
UNITED STATES   
1971, Dec 18  bb  SA; [discretionary policy oriented to domestic conditions, based on Fed 
Funds rate targeting; weekly money targets were more ‘forecasts’ than 
‘targets’ (desired)]; 
1973, Feb 12  dd  major currencies abandon peg to USD; [M targets become real objectives, 
instead of mere forecasts]; 
1975, April  md  M1 target announced [targets were quarterly revised and frequently 
overshot; policy still based on Fed Funds rate targeting]; 
1979, Oct 6  mm  non borrowed reserves targeting announced; [greater weight on M targets]; 
1982, Oct  md  borrowed reserves targeting [M targets de-emphasised]; 
1986  dd  [abandon of M targets; concern for financial asset prices]. 
Sources: General: IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, OECD 
Economic Surveys, Bernanke and Mishkin (1992), Goodhart and Viñals (1994); Australia: Stevens and 
Debelle (1995); Canada: Freedman (1995), Howitt (1993); France: Mélitz (1993); Germany: Bernanke 
and Mihov (1997), Clarida and Gertler (1997), Kloten (1992), Neumann and von Hagen (1993), von 
Hagen (1995); Italy: Spinelli and Tirelli (1993), Visco (1995); Japan: Ichimura (1993), Tamura (1992); 
New Zealand: Fischer (1995); Spain: Ayuso and Escrivá (1997); Sweden: Svensson (1995); Switzerland: 
Wasserfallen  and  Kursteiner  (1994);  UK:  Artis  and  Lewis  (1991),  Bowen  (1995),  Goodhart  (1992), 
Minford (1993); US: Mayer (1992), Meulendyke (1990).      
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